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MDGS 2.0: WHAT GOALS, TARGETS, AND TIMEFRAME? 
 
Jonathan Karver, Charles Kenny, and Andy Sumner 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are widely cited as the primary yardstick against 
which advances in international development efforts are to be judged. At the same time, the 
Goals will be met or missed by 2015. It is not too early to start asking what's next? 
This paper builds on a discussion that has already begun to address potential approaches, 
goals, and target indicators to help inform the process of developing a second generation of 
MDGs or ‘MDGs 2.0.’ The paper outlines potential goal areas based on the original Millennium 
Declaration, the timeframe for any MDGs 2.0 and attempts to calculate some reasonable targets 
associated with those goal areas. 
 
This paper was previously published as a Centre for Global Development (CGD) working 
paper. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In September 2000 the largest-ever gathering of heads of state and government (147 of them) 
met at the UN to unanimously adopt the Millennium Declaration, committing themselves to a 
series of international development objectives to be reached by 2015. The eight Millennium 
Goals which evolved out of the Declaration are widely cited as the primary yardstick against 
which advances in international development efforts are to be judged. A sibling paper discusses 
the success of the MDGs in terms of motivating action and change over the past ten years 
(Kenny & Sumner, 2011). 
At the same time, the Goals will be met or missed by 2015. Their power to motivate will be 
considerably limited in 2016 (and may already be declining). Furthermore, a considerable 
literature has emerged suggesting that the Goals could have been better designed to set 
realistic appropriate development targets. It is not too early to start asking ‘what next?’ Indeed, if 
new goals with as yet unmeasured targets are to be proposed, time is running very short. The 
current set of MDGs were the product of ten years of UN conferencing –a luxury which will 
(largely) not be available for a second round if it begins in 2015. 
The September 2010 MDG Summit outcome document also mandated the UN Secretary 
General to initiate a consultation process of what would come after 2015, and to recommend in 
his annual reports ‘further steps to advance the United Nations development agenda beyond 
2015’ (UNGA, 2010 p. 29).  
Box 1 outlines one possible timetable going forward drawing upon Manning (2009). It is also 
possible there will be neither an agreement on any post-2015 framework nor an extension of the 
current MDGs. One additional element may be the 2012 Rio Summit, where Colombia has 
proposed the agreement of Sustainable Development Goals “similar to and supportive of the 
MDGs.”1 The Rio Summit might provide language or goal areas that would be adopted as part 
of any new set of MDGs agreed in September 2015 at the UN General Assembly (UNGA). 
 
Box 1. One possible post-MDG timetable 
2012  UNSG Taskforce Report produced 
Spring 2013 UNSG proposals 
Sept. 2013 ‘Special Session’ of UNGA 
2014  Proposals for indicators for framework 
Sept. 2015 UNGA agrees new framework 
Source: Adapted from Manning, 2009, pp. 70–71. 
 
In light of the compressed time frame (relative to the time spent on MDGs 1.0) this paper builds 
on a discussion that has already begun evaluating potential approaches, goals and target 
indicators to help inform the process of developing ‘MDGs 2.0.’ 2 A recent contribution to the 
literature (which borrows analysis from an earlier draft of this paper and shares a co-author) is 
“Getting to Zero: Finishing the Job the MDGs Started” by McArthur et. al. (2012). 
                                                 
1 UNCSD (2011) 
2 See discussion in Melamed & Sumner (2011) prepared for the UNDP-ODI Cairo workshop and academic forums such as the 
2009 conference on ‘After 2015: Promoting Pro-poor Policy after the MDGs’ in Brussels, convened by DSA-EADI-ActionAid-
IDS-DFID or ‘The MDGs and Human Rights’, convened by Harvard Law School, Oslo University IDS and UNICEF’, 22–23 
March 2010. 
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Any discussion begs the question of how goals and targets should be set in the first place. The 
initial MDGs were largely drawn from the OECD DAC report, Shaping the 21st Century: The 
Contribution of Development Co-operation, published in May 1996,3 which created the 
International Development Goals (effectively the MDGs minus Goal Eight) those in turn drew on 
a range of goals set by various international development conferences. Subsequently, a series 
of expert group meetings jointly sponsored by the OECD, United Nations, and the World Bank 
refined the goals and identified a set of 21 indicators for measuring progress (see Manning, 
2009 for full history).  
There are calls for a considerably more participatory approach leading up to 2015. For example, 
the emerging NGO discussions at Civicus/GCAP and in the ‘Beyond 2015’ campaign, is 
coalescing around an “Essential Must-Haves for a Global Development Framework”.4 These 
suggest that any replacement MDG framework should be developed in a participative and 
inclusive way which particularly seeks to involve the voices of excluded groups and people 
directly affected by poverty and injustice. 
Clearly in the run-up to 2015 there will be numerous sets of principles and proposals. One 
approach might be a goal-led framework, but either set by national governments through 
deliberative processes, or by a combination of a streamlined set of global indicators (child 
nutrition, infant mortality and primary/secondary completion rates, among others) with actual 
indicators and targets set by national governments via deliberative processes. A second 
approach would be much bolder and more ambitious. It would build a global agreement binding 
both north and south, with poverty targets for the south and sustainable consumption targets for 
the north. It could focus on global public goods and global issues, of which extreme poverty and 
climate-resilient development are central, or it could focus on the national dimensions in 
development in both north and south or what Manning (2009) refers to this as a ‘One World’ 
approach (see Sumner & Tiwari, 2011 for further discussion). There are many other potential 
approaches. 
For the sake of tractability (not because the authors necessarily favour such an approach all 
else equal), this paper will assume that post-2015 goals will be based around a reaffirmation of 
the Millennium Declaration. The Declaration (to which all UN member states agreed) consists of 
six ‘fundamental values’ including freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature, 
and shared responsibility. Some of these are only partially represented in the MDGs, and a new 
agreement might seek to address this. We also assume that ‘new MDGs’ will again be global 
and ‘top down’ targets, although perhaps better incorporating the understanding that country 
targets should be developed out of the global goals via some kind of national deliberation 
process.  
With those caveats on the need for an inclusive process and the paper’s limited scope, this 
paper discusses potential new or revised goals and targets, as well as time frames and tools to 
set target levels. It also presents a potential ‘straw man’ list of MDGs including indicative targets 
based on IMF growth projection scenarios and World Bank inequality estimates for income 
poverty, a simple model of progress using historical data for some non-income poverty 
indicators and other approaches in areas including education and the environment. This ‘straw 
man’ list should be seen as part of an effort to help dialogue on the post-2015 goals as well as 
methods to set targets, and by no means a definitive proposal for the shape of MDGs 2.0 to be 
                                                 
3 OECD/DAC (1996) 
4 See: http://www.beyond2015.org and http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jun/17/millennium-
development-goals-beyond-2015  
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agreed upon in 2015. We suggest some potential language associated with those goals, again 
and most emphatically in the spirit of an input to discussion.  
Section 2 discusses potential goals and target indicators linked to Millennium Declaration 
language. Section 3 discusses timeframes. Section 4 focuses on strawman targets themselves 
for the goals discussed previously. Section 5 concludes. 
2. REFORMULATING GOALS 
The original goals have the considerable advantage of having been ratified in the Millennium 
Declaration from which they were drawn, by 147 heads of state, suggesting that the areas which 
they cover are open to wide consensus. At the same time, there have been calls for additions or 
changes. The major criticisms include: 
• The goals mis-specify or ignore important areas (growth, jobs, war/conflict, institutions, 
population) and mis-target others (a goal for education not learning). There is a debate 
as to whether the Goals should define human development outcomes, or 
opportunities to achieve outcomes. Related to this, the goals are weak on underlying 
causes of poverty and on social justice – meaning equity, rights, vulnerability and 
exclusion related issues. (This is an issue the Secretary General has raised himself in 
his annual MDG report).5 
• The goals are over-specified: some overlap (universal education and education equity), 
there are multiple goals and targets in the same area (health). 
• None of the goals have been taken to be binding on industrialised countries. Goal Eight 
on global cooperation is notably absent of hard targets. It is worth noting, of course, that 
none of the Goals are legally binding on anyone anywhere, nor is it clear who is 
responsible to meet them. 
A first question is whether the existing measures in the Goals or related targets capture 
(reasonably) precisely the nature of the ‘development’ characteristic claimed to be addressed 
(see Table 1). In education, completion does not necessary imply ‘learning’. In health, the Goals 
privilege child and maternal outcomes over (quality-adjusted) life years in the population as a 
whole. Gender equality has been reduced to equality in access to education. There is 
widespread dissatisfaction over the environmental goals because there are few targets and it is 
not even clear what way indicators are supposed to move (Sadasivam, 2005:31-32). Across the 
Goals, there are considerable questions about the quality of underlying data and revisions, not 
least as Leo & Thuotte, (2011) note, for example, 31 of 67 countries revised their primary 
completion (MDG 2) data in 2010/11.
                                                 
5 UNGA, 2011 
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Table 1. MDG Target Indicators and Selected Contentions 
MDG Target Indicator Contentions 
Dollar-a-day PPP (and 
$1.25/day) 
- Basis for particular thresholds (US$1, $1.25 or $2/day) open 
to question (the first was the average of eight countries’ 
poverty lines in 1980, the second is the average of the 
world’s poorest 15 countries in 2005 and the third is the 
median average of all poverty lines for all developing 
countries in 2005 (see Ravallion, Chen, & Sangraula, 2008); - Range of questions about purchasing power parity (see 
Deaton & Dupriez, 2011) - Limited account of differential experiences (especially intra-
household, as typically based on the household head);  - Lack of attention to public goods; - Ignores the physical condition of the individual (Sen’s 
critique); - Highly sensitive to the construction of the poverty line and 
the pricing of items and basket weighting of components; - Problems with heterogeneous household sizes and 
compositions of households; - Comparability and consistency of national household surveys 
questionable due to different consumption patterns in 
different countries; - Lack information on the depth and severity of poverty and 
inequality among the poor.  
Hunger - Unclear that existing measures accurately capture 
malnutrition (See Banerjee & Duflo, 2011). 
Employment - ‘Full and productive’ employment very difficult to define 
especially where a considerable proportion of activity is self 
employed and/or informal sector based. 
Primary school completion - Does not necessarily mean daily attendance, high quality 
education in terms of teaching and resources; or that 
learning has been achieved; - May be over-reported through children repeating years or 
inaccurate records on total number of children in age 
cohorts. 
Gender equity - Equality in access to schooling hardly encompasses all 
aspects of equality even within education, let alone in other 
areas of life (e.g. no mention of the Beijing target of access 
to reproductive health care, which was in the pre-cursor to 
the MDGs, the OECD DAC International Development 
Targets) 
Health, mortality - Unclear why child and maternal mortality favored over 
quality-adjusted life years in the population as a whole; - Accurate birth and death records may not exist (and cause of 
death for maternal mortality rates). 
HIV/Malaria - Question as to highlighting particular health input conditions 
rather than health outcomes (mortality, morbidity, life 
expectancy). 
Reverse loss of 
environmental resources, 
reduce biodiversity loss 
- Indicators too vague; - Missing key issues such as climate change, fisheries, etc. 
Access to water and 
sanitation 
- Individuals may be recorded as having access to water or 
sanitation even when the facilities are broken or the person is 
physically unable to reach them; 
- Input to health conditions, unclear why privileged. 
Slum dwellers - Measure very vague. 
Source: Expanded and developed from original table in Sumner and Tiwari (2009). 
With regard to over-specification, in health, Vandemoortele & Delamonica (2010) 
argue that the three health-related goals could be collapsed into one overall 
health goal. Similarly, there are two overlapping goals covering universal primary 
education and gender parity in education (the first implies the second at the 
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primary level). Lastly, it has been argued that local environmental goals are to 
some extent covered by other outcome indicators (e.g. health).6 
While there is mis-specification and over-specification in some areas, the MDGs 
do not capture at all areas including governance, vulnerability or subjective 
definitions of poverty and ill-being. In exercises like Voices of the Poor, poor 
people suggest important elements of poverty include risk, vulnerability, security, 
dignity and voice –as well as the importance of jobs and infrastructure. A number 
of national MDG strategies have incorporated such additional measures of 
poverty.7 Again, law and order –the most basic functions of a state—are not 
included. And concerns regarding the inequality of outcomes are not directly 
addressed (Palma, 2011). On the side of donors, aid policy documents 
overwhelmingly mention peace and security as a goal of development 
assistance.8  
The original UN Millennium Declaration actually covered a number of these 
additional areas of broad based development including peace, security, 
disarmament, human rights, democracy and good governance. While there were 
no target dates for progress in these areas, the Declaration committed 
signatories to (inter alia) “strive for the full protection and promotion in all our 
countries of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights for all… the right to 
live their lives and raise their children in dignity, free from hunger and from the 
fear of violence, oppression or injustice.” The Declaration noted that “Democratic 
and participatory governance based on the will of the people best assures these 
rights.” The Millennium Declaration also called for “the elimination of weapons of 
mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons” and for countries “[t]o take 
concerted action to end illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons, especially 
by making arms transfers more transparent and supporting regional disarmament 
measures.”9  
The declaration suggests that 147 heads of state agreed progress in these 
broader areas was a good thing –even if the development of agreed metrics and 
timetables might pose insurmountable challenges. This suggests a ‘long-list’ of 
candidates for additional indicators. Table 2 uses language from the UN 
Millennium Declaration, including language from outside the specific section on 
‘development and poverty eradication’ and discusses their current or potential 
incorporation in the development goals. It provides a far from exhaustive list of 
potential MDG 2.0 goals associated with the original language from the UN 
Declaration.
                                                 
6 Fukuda-Parr and Greenstein make a broader point with regard to the interconnections between health 
and education Goals that may suggest the original MDGs had too many of them (2010, p. 5, footnote 7).  
They note that infant mortality, for example “reflects a number of circumstances, such as accessibility of 
clean water, sanitation facilities, the education of women, maternal-child health support, provision of 
primary healthcare facilities, provisioning for food security and others. Child survival, reflecting more 
broadly the health of children, is instrumentally important for other development objectives such as 
building human capital and facilitating the demographic transition.” 
7 See, for example, Sumner and Tiwari (2010) 
8 Fukuda-Parr (2008) and UNDP (2010). 
9 UN (2000) 
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Table 2. The Millennium Declaration, MDGs and some potential new MDG Areas  
 
Declaration Language Status in Current 
MDGs 
Potential MDG 2.0 Goal Areas  
II. Peace, security and disarmament  
 
  
…terrorism, drugs, transnational crime, weapons 
of mass destruction, small arms and light 
weapons, anti-personnel mines…. 
 
Not in current 
MDGs.  
 
- War deaths - Military expenditure  - Arms exports  
 
III. Development and poverty eradication 
 
  
An open, equitable, rule-based, predictable and 
non-discriminatory multilateral trading and 
financial system…. A policy of duty- and quota-
free access for essentially all exports from the 
least developed countries… Enhanced program 
of debt relief… More generous development 
assistance… 
 
MDG 8, but no 
specific targets.  
 
- Duty-free, quota-free language from original MDGs - Tariffs and subsidies on agriculture commodities  - 0.7% of GDP in aid from all high income countries - Commitment to finance costs of MDGs 2.0 on delivery  - ODA to low-income fragile states as % total ODA - Remove all OECD taxes on remittances 
 
To halve, by the year 2015, the proportion of the 
world’s people whose income is less than one 
dollar a day and the proportion of people who 
suffer from hunger  
MDG 1.  
 
- % of world living on >$1.25/day and/or >$2 - % GDP growth per capita - Reduction in those suffering from hunger - % children stunted  
 To halve, by 2015, the proportion of people who 
are unable to reach or to afford safe drinking 
water. 
 
MDG 8. 
 
- % who are unable to reach or to afford safe drinking water  - % reduction of those living without access to improved sanitation 
 
To ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, 
boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a 
full course of primary schooling and that girls and 
boys will have equal access to all levels of 
education. 
 
MDGs 2 & 3 
 
- % complete secondary schooling - % who cannot read and understand a simple paragraph. - Scores on internationally comparable tests 
By 2015, to have reduced maternal mortality by 
three quarters, and under-five child mortality by 
MDGs 4 & 5 - Maternal and under-five mortality - Subsume into broader health goal  
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two thirds, of their current rates 
To have, by 2015, halted, and begun to reverse, 
the spread of HIV/AIDS, the scourge of malaria 
and other major diseases that afflict humanity. 
 
MDG 6 
 
- Achieve AIDS transition - % reduction in new (malaria/HIV) infections  - % ensured ARV coverage  
 
To provide special assistance to children 
orphaned by HIV/AIDS. 
 
Not in MDGs 
 
- To provide special assistance to children orphaned by HIV/AIDS 
To have achieved, by 2020, a significant 
improvement in the lives of at least 100 million 
slum dwellers. 
 
MDG 7 
 
- Improve the lives of X million more slum dwellers.  
To promote gender equality and the 
empowerment of women. 
 
MDG 3 
 
- % reduction in earnings disparity - % reduction in gap of share in non-agricultural workforce - % increase in women’s representation in parliamentary bodies - % decline in girl/boy disparity at age five 
To develop and implement strategies that give 
young people everywhere a real chance to find 
decent and productive work. 
 
Not in MDGs 
 
- % reduction in gap between youth unemployment and total unemployment  
 
 
 
 
 
 
To encourage the pharmaceutical industry to 
make essential drugs more widely available and 
affordable by all who need them in developing 
countries. 
 
MDG 8 
 
- % ‘vital drugs’ available generic/at cost. 
 
To develop strong partnerships with the private 
sector and with civil society organizations in 
pursuit of development and poverty eradication. 
 
MDG 8 
 
- FDI/remittance/private sector aid flows 
 
To ensure that the benefits of new technologies, 
especially information and communication 
technologies… are available to all. 
 
MDG 8 
 
- % reduction of those without access to electricity/lighting/clean fuels - % reduction in population not covered by the mobile signal  - % of world with access to the Internet 
   
IV. Protecting our common environment 
To… embark on the required reduction in 
emissions of greenhouse gases... conservation 
and sustainable development of all types of 
forests... stop the unsustainable exploitation of 
MDG 7 
 
- % increase in forest cover - % rise in ratio of protected areas - % of energy from non-fossil sources - GHG emissions/capita  
Fuel production per capita (in tons CO2 equivalent)  
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water resources… To intensify cooperation to 
reduce the number and effects of natural and 
man-made disasters. 
 
- Tax on gasoline $ PPP/litre - % reduction in CO2 emissions per capita/per unit of GDP - Halt known species extinction - Manage agricultural/fisheries resources sustainably 
V. Human rights, democracy and good 
governance 
Promote democracy and strengthen the rule of 
law… strive for the full protection and promotion 
in all our countries of civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights for all… combat all 
forms of violence against women …work 
collectively for more inclusive political 
processes… ensure the freedom of the media to 
perform their essential role and the right of the 
public to have access to information. 
 
Not in MDGs 
 
- % countries (world’s population) ranked free by polity/Freedom House  - % countries improve World Governance Indciators scores 
VI. Protecting the vulnerable 
Expand and strengthen the protection of civilians 
in complex emergencies… encourage the 
ratification and full implementation of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and its 
optional protocols on the involvement of children 
in armed conflict and on the sale of children, 
child prostitution and child pornography. 
 
Not in MDGs 
 
- Ratification of the convention on the rights of the child - % in child labor 
VII. Meeting the special needs of Africa 
Give full support to the political and institutional 
structures of emerging democracies in Africa… 
encourage and sustain regional and subregional 
mechanisms for preventing conflict and 
promoting political stability, and to ensure a 
reliable flow of resources for peacekeeping 
operations on the continent…take special 
measures to address the challenges of poverty 
eradication and sustainable development in 
Africa, including debt cancellation, improved 
market access, enhanced Official Development 
Assistance and increased flows of Foreign Direct 
Investment, as well as transfers of technology… 
help Africa build up its capacity to tackle the 
spread of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and other 
infectious diseases. 
Not in MDGs 
 
- Aid/capita received in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) - FDI flows/capita received in SSA - Debt /GDP in SSA - Weighted tariffs faced by SSA exports - % aid to improve health systems in Africa 
 
 12 
 
To move from the long list presented in Table 2 to a more manageable and 
realistic set of enumerated targets, it is enough to note some constraints faced by 
any potential goals: they have to be ubiquitously accepted as important foci for 
development efforts with global applicability. Perhaps most importantly, they will 
need to be acceptable to a consensus gathering of world leaders. Realistically, 
new numerical goals in particular would also have to involve targets that are 
preferably already measured. Failing that, they should be targets that are easy to 
measure –with accuracy and using relatively non-controversial indicators. They 
should also be amenable to both relatively rapid change and influenced by policy, 
so that even with the challenges of accurate measurement, progress is possible 
to discern. Absent a robust objective method to evaluate which potential goals 
meet these thresholds, we have used our subjective opinions, hopefully 
somewhat justified below.  
With regard to potential goals covering peace, security and disarmament, the 
issue of measurement may be a major factor –not least, there is no official UN 
count of global war deaths. Major arms exporters and importers would likely 
resist a measure that suggested reducing arms exports using a particular metric 
was an unalloyed good. Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP may be a 
more politically plausible numerical goal area at the global level and is presented 
in internationally agreed data sets. Having said that, discussions around drafts of 
this paper suggests such a numerical target may remain politically unacceptable 
to a large number of countries.  
Similarly with human rights, democracy and governance, there are no 
internationally agreed measures of the quality of a country’s governance or 
respect for rights. Given that, it appears doubtful that a consensus decision 
would be reached to include Freedom House or Worldwide Governance Indicator 
measures as part of any target related to a governance and rights goal, as it 
might be. This suggests that any language in a Millennium Declaration update 
would have to remain unquantified as in the original Declaration. There are 
internationally accepted numbers on child labor that might be used to monitor 
progress on protecting the vulnerable, however the underlying data is very 
weak.10 Given that, it is not clear that a separate numerical child labor goal would 
add considerably to a school enrolment goal. 
Turning to the development and poverty goals, a considerable complaint 
regarding the original MDGs is that they ignored income growth and jobs, which 
are of the highest priority both to political leaders and to people in rich and poor 
countries alike according to poll evidence.11 At the same time, it is not clear what 
benefit a specific international development goal on global income growth per 
capita would have in terms of influencing policy in a particular direction (in that it 
appears unlikely to influence economic policy in the US and China, for example). 
This perhaps implies that a statement of the centrality of growth to the 
development process but absent a target may be the appropriate incorporation. 
Again, while the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) elevation of ‘decent 
                                                 
10 Dillon, et al. (2010) 
11 Tortora & Marlar (2010) 
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work’ as a universal target might be included in goal language,12 a specific 
numerical indicator would be harder to add, because the nature of work varies so 
considerably between low and high-income countries. The initial MDG’s focus on 
the incomes of the World’s poorest people surely remains a more suitable 
development goal.  
In that regard, we follow Santos & Sumner (2012) in focusing on a $2 poverty line 
for three reasons: (i) because it is the average (median) poverty line of all 
developing countries rather than the $1.25 measure, which is the mean of the 
national poverty lines of the poorest 15 countries in terms of consumption per 
capita (Chen & Ravallion, 2008, p. 4; Chen & Ravallion, 2010); (ii) because given 
that the current MDGs are based on $1 (updated to $1.25), it makes sense to 
raise aspirations for any new set of MDGs (iii) because there will likely be 2 
billion people living under $2 in contrast to just 0.6-0.8bn under $1.25 in 2015 
and thus, again, the aspiration for a 2030 target should have some ‘stretch’ built-
in and (iv) by 2030 it is reasonable to think $2 will represent extreme poverty 
(noting that the $1/day poverty line in 1990 became $1.25/day in 2005). 
In addition, there has been some discussion of the inclusion of a measure of 
income inequality within the MDGs. As the Goals are set at the global level, and 
given that the great majority of income inequality worldwide is accounted for by 
variation in average incomes across countries, this would amount to a Goal 
calling for income convergence. It might be better to have an explicit 
convergence target in the Declaration --that progress in goal areas should be 
more rapid in groups and countries that are currently furthest behind. There are 
various other proposals for including inequality - the details and merits of which 
are discussed by Melamed (2012): 
- Country level gini coefficient targets 
- Weight progress on all indicators using equity criteria (See 
Vandemoortele and Delamonica, 2010). 
- Specific targets for the poorest groups (see CIGI, 2011). 
- Universal targets (see (Aryeetey et al., 2012)). 
The original MDGs had multiple goals related both to health inputs (water), 
particular diseases (HIV, malaria) and particular forms of mortality (maternal, 
child). For the sake of continuity, some of this overlap might continue into the 
second round of the MDGs not least because none of MDGs were to eradicate 
these forms of poverty – rather to reduce them by various proportions. However 
commentators have seen the health area as one where simplification might be a 
virtue. Life expectancy might provide a more suitable overall health target, 
although a special focus on child mortality might remain in addition because of 
the Declaration’s specific focus on the vulnerable.  
Again, the original MDGs had overlapping education goals. The goals also 
suffered from being input measures rather than measures of learning. This does 
suggest the advantage of adding a goal related to learning outcomes. Given the 
focus of the MDGs on the most disadvantaged, an appropriate indicator might be 
                                                 
12 ILO (2011) 
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basic numeracy and literacy. One issue with such a measure is that current 
literacy statistics are largely derived from a calculation which assumes children 
who have completed primary education are literate –an assumption that appears 
empirically untrue. This increases the complexity of setting a realistic target, a 
topic returned to later in the paper. At the same time, to ensure goal language 
relevant to more developed countries, a goal covering secondary education and 
outcomes might be an additional candidate. 
The existing gender equity goals are narrowly focused on education. At the same 
time, reductions in earnings disparity or share in non-agricultural workforce 
appear unsuitable global goals because of their limited applicability to majority 
rural societies. Women’s representation in parliamentary bodies is open to the 
challenge that some countries have reserved seats for women in parliament but 
that this poorly reflects overall levels of gender equity. A potential goal that may 
be both politically acceptable and reflects the underlying status of women and 
girls in a society is the demographic gender balance under the age of five.  
In the area of infrastructure, beyond water, the original MDGs focused on 
improving the lives of 100 million slum dwellers by 2020. It is unclear why slum-
dwellers should be prioritized over the rural poor, and the goal was under-
specified, regardless. A goal focusing on sufficient energy access to provide 
basic lighting and healthy cooking may be an attractive option –this is the focus 
of the UN Sustainable Energy For All Initiative, which seeks (inter alia) to ensure 
universal access to modern energy services. This is also an area where 
advances in off-grid electricity technology may allow for rapid rollout of electricity 
in a manner akin to mobile telephone rollout in the first decade of the Twenty 
First Century. With regard to communications infrastructure, the last ten years of 
mobile signal rollout suggests that the goal of universal access to modern 
communications is plausible by 2030 –something we examine further in the 
section on targets.  
The MDGs may provide the opportunity to set a UN goal for global emissions of 
greenhouse gasses, taking advantage of the fact that the declaration will not be a 
legally binding commitment on the behalf on signatories. The UN Sustainable 
Energy For All Initiative suggests reducing global energy intensity by 40% and 
increasing renewable energy use globally by 30% by 2030. Additional goals 
might cover forest area and biodiversity, where the 2010 Nagoya Conference of 
the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity set goals covering 
sustainable management of agriculture, fisheries and forests as well as subsidies 
harmful to biodiversity and species extinction. 
With regard to language on rich country support for development, beyond the 
duty-free, quota-free language from the original MDGs, it is unclear that specific 
language on tariffs or subsides could be agreed upon, given the failure of the 
Doha round to make progress in this area. More generally, the original MDG 
process suggested the difficulty of tying particular groups of countries to specific 
policy reforms as part of a declaration that was to be universally accepted 
regarding aspirations for global progress. Given that the original MDG process 
built on the back of ten years of UN summits, while the process for any follow-up 
MDGs will be an accelerated consultation largely taking place between 2013 and 
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2015, it appears even less likely that an updated set of goals would include much 
in the way of binding policy commitments.  
For example, in order to tie ‘Goal Eight’ language on global partnerships more 
closely to the other goals (and allow third parties to know if it is being adhered 
to), it might be possible to imagine Cash on Delivery mechanisms where donors 
pre-commit to provide financing to countries which out-perform previous historical 
rates of progress and are on track to reach their MDG target, as it might be.13 At 
the same time, it is not yet clear that cash on delivery could work across MDG 
target areas, nor are actual costs of achieving those targets available, nor is the 
suitable level for outside payments towards meeting those agreed upon targets. 
Under those circumstances, specific target language on cash on delivery 
appears inappropriate. Similarly, in a situation where the development needs, 
number and size of fragile or stagnating economies worldwide (or in Africa) a 
specific target of the percentage of resources flowing to fragile states or Africa in 
2030 appears over-restrictive.  
From the discussion in Table 2, we propose a list of potential goal areas where 
numerical targets could be set: 
1. Poverty: $2/day, malnutrition 
2. Health: Life expectancy, child mortality  
3. Education: Literacy, secondary education 
4. Gender: Population disparity under the age of five  
5. Sustainable Development: Forest area; alternative energy as a 
percentage of total, GHG emissions, species extinction 
6. Peace: Military expenditure as % GDP  
7. Infrastructure: Access to mobile signal, access to improved energy 
sources 
8. Development: Duty Free Access, Aid 0.7% 
It is worth emphasizing at this point that other goal areas could and should be 
included in any update to the Millennium Declaration, even if numerical targets 
may not be plausible or widely accepted, using language that is as specific as 
possible (we propose some such language later in the paper). Furthermore, we 
repeat the caveat that we see this list as part of an effort to feed a discussion of 
the next round of MDGs rather than in any way a perfect proposal for the 
framework and coverage of any follow on MDGs. 
 
                                                 
13 And why do we have MDG indicators at all? 
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3. WHAT TIME FRAME?  
Vandemoortele & Delamonica (2010) note that the Millennium Declaration does not 
in fact mention the baseline year –and that this was intentional because world 
leaders could not agree on such a baseline. 1990 was selected by “the architects of 
the MDGs… based on historical trends at the global level” –as part of a follow-up 
“Road Map” exercise (See Manning, 2009 for detailed history). 
 
Thus while the Goals were based in large part on internationally agreed targets set 
at UN conferences, the imposition of a standard 1990 baseline and 2015 
completion date considerably altered the ambition of some goals compared to those 
international targets.  
 
Pogge (2010) suggests that the MDGs were made less ambitious than previous 
international commitments at a global level by choosing a 1990 baseline and by 
using percentages rather than the absolute number of disadvantaged people 
(see table 3). The Rome Food Summit refers to halving the “proportion” whereas 
the Millennium Declaration refers to halving the “number”. Given that the world 
population will have increased by 120% between 2000 and 2015, a reduction of 
the number of poor to 60% of what it was in 2000 is enough to cut the proportion 
in half. Thus the Millennium Declaration is actually offering a 40% cut and the 
MDG itself given the population growth and the baseline amounts to just a 27% 
cut. 
Table 3. Pogge’s comparison of hunger target setting 
  World Food Summit Millennium Declaration MDGs 
Baseline year 1996 2000 1990 
Baseline number of Poor (mill) 1,656 1,665 1,813 
Promised poverty reduction by 2015 50.00% 40.40% 27.00% 
Target for 2015 828 993 1,324 
Required annual rate of reduction 3.58% 3.39% 1.25% 
Adapted from Pogge (2010, p. 3).  
Meanwhile, Vandemoortele and Delamonica’s claim that the architects of the 
MDGs used rates of historical progress to set targets is surprising, because this 
would entail using very patchy analysis to make trendline predictions. Manning 
reports that the percentage of countries with at least two data points since 1990 
for a short list of MDG indicators only reached 71% in 2008. With better data, 
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perhaps we would have set an earlier baseline date, and could be declaring 
broader success in 2015. The challenge was surely exacerbated by having to 
choose a single start year. Setting an earlier year would have made the poverty 
MDG target even less of a stretch goal even while it may have made some other 
targets more plausible to accomplish. And setting a start year too early would 
have made a mockery of the various international fora where the targets were 
first laid out.  
 
To summarize, the MDG architects had to walk a tightrope between ambitious 
targets set at UN conferences and practical targets that could plausibly be met 
and were politically palatable, all on the basis of weak and missing data. Under 
these constraints, the MDG baseline of 1990 performed well. At the same time, 
the combination of data problems and the almost immediate pressure to adopt 
global targets as country targets (see below) made the Goals more ambitious 
than many framers intended (see discussion in Kenny and Sumner, 2011). This 
is an important lesson for any new round of MDGs –which should specify a 
baseline year prior to an updated declaration –or set goals that are independent 
of a baseline year.  
So what are the options on time frames? One could take a 15 or 25 year time line 
based on the basis of MDG 1.0 being 2000 vs 2015 or 1990 vs 2015. That could 
mean a new time line of 2015 vs 2030 or 2015 vs 2040. However given the 
actual data availability in 2015 will largely date to 2010 or near after that time 
point (perhaps 2011-2013) it makes sense to retain the fifteen year ‘operational 
period’ of the original MDGs but anchor the new MDGs to a date for which we 
actually have a full(ish) dataset as the baseline to assess systematically progress 
towards – in short 2010 as the baseline and 2030 the target line.  
4. SETTING TARGETS  
The original targets were set at a global level, largely based on global 
declarations. They were set divorced from any strong understanding of potential 
country-level rates of progress based on historical experience. Countries have 
now been repeatedly assessed as to being on track or off track to meet the 
MDGs. As noted in a companion paper (Kenny and Sumner 2011), moving from 
a global to a country level has a dramatic impact on the ambitiousness of targets. 
Whereas a global goal sets a target for (population weighted) average country 
progress, a country-level goal sets a target for minimum progress. For example, 
a goal to reduce child mortality by two thirds at the global level suggests that the 
average rate of progress at the country level (weighted by population) is a two-
thirds reduction. Give or take (assuming equal population distribution) half of 
countries will see slower than two thirds progress, and half of countries will see 
faster than two thirds progress. If the Goal is reset as a universal country target, 
all countries are expected to reduce mortality by at least two thirds –obviously a 
harder target to reach. Any second round should learn from this experience, and 
make clear that global goals should not be interpreted as necessarily attainable 
at the country level for every country.  
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Klasen & Lange (2011) have set out a method for predicting under-five mortality, 
primary completion, and gender equality in education using past performance.14 
Here we set out a simpler but similar approach across a wider range of 
indicators. Existing analysis of global patterns of change in development 
indicators suggests that simple models based on cross-country experience of 
transition to high levels of health and education can predict change at the country 
level with considerable accuracy (Kenny and Sumner 2011, Casabonne & 
Kenny, 2011). Country-level forecasts based on such models provide the 
baseline for expected progress to the goal end-point, for education, health and 
other development outcomes.  
There remain risks of forecasting using historical data, of course. The outlook 
over the next 15 to 25 years may be one of ‘shifting vulnerabilities’ or multiple, 
interacting and compound stressors and crises as a result of the ‘perfect storm’ 
or ‘long crisis’ thesis of the interaction of demographics, climate change, food 
and energy prices, and resource scarcity (see for discussion (Beddington, 2009; 
(Evans, 2010); Evans, et al. , 2010).15 The world of today looks considerably 
different from the world from which the historical data on trends for forecasting is 
being drawn –it has many more middle income countries, new donors, stuttering 
industrial economies and so on. These are all likely to have an impact on future 
rates of change in indicators of broad-based development. 
Furthermore, this approach does not work for all Goal areas. Casabonne & 
Kenny (2011) demonstrate that income growth rates are far too volatile to predict 
on the basis of past trends, which implies that poverty reduction will not be 
amenable to a naïve forecasting approach. With literacy, there is insufficient data 
to make a forecast based on past trends. With some environmental variables, 
especially regarding climate change, any forecast based around ‘business as 
usual’ trendlines will be grossly inadequate to provide a meaningful target to 
respond to the challenge faced. 
4A. SETTING INCOME POVERTY TARGETS 
For poverty forecasts, rather than a model based on historical experience, we 
use IMF Growth projections data and make the assumption of static inequality. It 
is important to note the caveats that attach to such an exercise. Historical 
experience suggests growth rates across countries are both volatile and very 
hard to predict over 15 year periods. The record of forecasts over naïve 
projections based on past growth rates is limited, and growth rates over 
consecutive fifteen year periods are very weakly correlated (see Kenny and 
                                                 
14 Klasen and Lange’s (2011)  empirical model is based on the assumption that progress towards high levels 
of human development follows an s-shaped (logistic) path, similar to Clemens, 2004 and Clemens, et al., 
2007. The main difference between their modeling of the historical trend of progress in child mortality and 
primary completion rests in the specification of their indicator, which is log-normalized, and the period 
between lags, which in their model is 5 years. Furthermore, the authors estimate their model using country 
fixed effects. In estimating the transition speed of the indicator as the rate of change in the indicator per 
annum, they obtain similar results to our model in terms of the high levels of variation in the indicator 
explained by the model (r-squared above 0.80) 
15 The conclusion of the US National Intelligence Council Report (USNIC, 2008, p. xii), based on a 
widespread and large academic consultation, before the global economic crisis is sobering: ‘trends suggest 
major discontinuities, shocks and surprises’. That said one recent World Bank paper optimistically argues 
that growth will offset climate impacts on poverty: Skoufias, et al. (2011) 
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Williams, 2001, for a review of the evidence). Furthermore, global poverty 
outcomes depend considerably on growth projections for individual countries 
(China and India in particular); the evolution of income distributions within each 
country; any re-evaluation of PPPs and changes in population growth (see 
discussion in Kanbur & Sumner, 2011). Given that, the uncertainty attached to 
poverty forecasts is considerable. 
The following analysis draws on the approach taken by both Moss & Leo (2011) 
and Santos and Sumner (2012) who set out three growth scenarios as follows: 
An optimistic scenario assumes that from 2009 to 2030 average incomes will 
grow at the forecasted average growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product based 
on PPP per capita estimates from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) for 
the period 2009-2014. The moderately optimistic growth scenario assumes that 
from 2009 average incomes will grow at the forecasted average growth rate of 
the Gross Domestic Product (PPP) per capita for the period 2009-2014, minus 
1% (as this is the average error historically observed in IMF growth projections 
as per Aldenhoff (2007). Finally, a pessimistic growth scenario assumes that 
from 2009 the aggregate income of the poor will grow at half the forecasted 
average growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product based on PPP for the period 
2009-2014, while population growth will remain at the forecasted rate. There is 
no theoretical basis for this as the lower bound possibility --in fact the reality 
could be much worse than this.  
Using the growth forecasts to predict country change in average income between 
the latest survey and 2030, we use the World Bank’s POVCALNET (which has 
data on current income distributions) to produce estimates of the proportion of 
country that would be in poverty in 2030 assuming the given income growth and 
static inequality.16  
                                                 
16 For each country we have 3 annual average growth scenarios developed from IMF WEO growth projections.  
We develop country GDP/capita forecast for 2030 for each country for each scenario.  We use POVCAL to 
calculate 2030 poverty using the following technique to adjust PPP: PPP(forecast) = PPP(2005)/((2030 average 
GDP/capita)/(latest survey year average GDP/capita)).  This provides a percentage poverty estimate which we 
combine with 2030 population predictions from the WDI to get absolute numbers below poverty for each country 
by each growth scenario and global and regional totals. 
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Table 4. Estimates of $1.25 poverty in 2030 
  Pessimistic Moderate Optimistic Pessimistic Moderate Optimistic 
  
Number of 
$1.25 poor 
(millions) 
Number of 
$1.25 poor 
(millions) 
Number of 
$1.25 poor 
(millions) 
Poverty as % 
of world 
population 
Poverty as % 
of world 
population 
Poverty as % 
of world 
population 
World 678.3 341.1 230.8 8.2 4.1 2.8 
       
Region       
East Asia & 
Pacific 47.4 17 8.2 0.6 0.2 0.1 
China 1.1 0.4 0.4 0 0 0 
Europe & 
Central Asia 4.2 1.7 1 0.1 0 0 
Latin 
America & 
Caribbean  
28.6 23 15.5 0.3 0.3 0.2 
Middle East 
& North 
Africa 
11.8 4.7 2.3 0.1 0.1 0 
South Asia 94.6 12.5 4 1.1 0.2 0 
India 27.9 1.7 0.9 0.3 0 0 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
491.7 282.2 199.8 5.9 3.4 2.4 
Sources: Data processed from Povcal (2011) and IMF WEO (2011) based on static inequality. Notes: As per 
Moss and Leo (2011) Optimistic scenario = average annual growth projection for 2009-2014 of IMF WEO for 
period 2010-2030; Moderate scenario = average annual growth projection for 2009-2014 of IMF WEO minus 
1% for period 2010-2030; Pessimistic = half of average annual growth projection for 2009-2014 IMF WEO for 
period 2010-2030.
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Table 5. Estimates of $2 poverty in 2030 
  Pessimistic Moderate Optimistic Pessimistic Moderate Optimistic 
  
Number of 
$2 poor 
(millions) 
Number of 
$2 poor 
(millions) 
Number of 
$2 poor 
(millions) 
Poverty as % 
of world 
population 
Poverty as % 
of world 
population 
Poverty as % 
of world 
population 
World 1,573.60 798.3 558 18.9 9.6 6.7 
       
Region       
East Asia & 
Pacific 162.20 68.60 38.50 1.90 0.80 0.50 
China 1.20 0.60 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Europe & 
Central Asia 16.50 6.30 3.40 0.20 0.10 0.00 
Latin 
America & 
Caribbean  
67.30 52.00 36.20 0.80 0.60 0.40 
Middle East 
& North 
Africa 
43.40 19.80 11.00 0.50 0.20 0.10 
South Asia 504.70 121.10 52.90 6.10 1.50 0.60 
India 279.50 17.40 5.60 3.40 0.20 0.10 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
779.40 530.40 416.00 9.40 6.40 5.00 
Sources: Data processed from Povcal (2011) and IMF WEO (2011) based on static inequality. Notes: As per 
Moss and Leo (2011) Optimistic scenario = average annual growth projection for 2009-2014 of IMF WEO for 
period 2010-2030; Moderate scenario = average annual growth projection for 2009-2014 of IMF WEO minus 
1% for period 2010-2030; Pessimistic = half of average annual growth projection for 2009-2014 IMF WEO for 
period 2010-2030. 
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4B. DESCRIPTION OF DATA FOR NON-INCOME FORECASTS 
For the non-income Goal targets that can be set using past trends to provide an 
accurate forecast, the data used to predict progress comes from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators, the United Nations Statistics Division, and 
two independent studies. Table 6 lists the indicators with the time periods 
covered, the number of countries for which there is sufficient data to perform 
regression analysis, and any limitations (real or potential) related to the indicator 
itself or the measurement thereof. It is worth emphasizing a caveat: data 
weaknesses are considerable across the board and many indicators seem to 
follow such a predictable pattern over time precisely because the underlying data 
is in fact modeled.  
Data for secondary completion and child mortality goes back to 1960, but since 
the regressions are used to predict historical progress in 20 year increments 
through 2030, the baseline year for these indicators is taken at 1970, and taken 
as 1990 for those indicators which do not have a reasonable number of data 
point prior to 1990.
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Table 6. MDG 2.0 Indicators: Measurability and Limitations 
Indicator 
Source 
Availability 
(countries)* Availability (time-series)** Limitations 
Secondary Completion (% of population 25 
and older) 
Soto and Cohen (2010)1 95 1970-2010 Includes only 20 low income countries. Values 
 are estimates. 
Child Mortality Rate (number of deaths at 
age 1-4 years per 1,000 children surviving 
to age 1) 
World Development 
Indicators (2011)2 
192 1970-2010 While true for most of the data, child mortality data in particular is said to 
be significantly underreported from 1960-1990. This would suggest that, 
given more reliable estimates for the 2000s, that the rate of change is 
actually under-reported. This would mean that our projections for 2030, 
based lower than expected rates of change, are actually over-reporting 
the levels of child mortality. 
Maternal Mortality Rate (per 100,000 live 
births) 
Hogan, Foreman, 
Naghaqvi, Ahn, Wang, 
Makela, Lopez, Lozano 
and Murray (2010) 
181 1990-2010 Full time series of data is modeled, implying that predictions may be 
overly optimistic in terms of reliability. 
Undernourishment (%) World Development 
Indicators (2011)2 
175 1990-2010  
Life Expectancy at Birth World Development 
Indicators (2011)2 
193 1970-2010  
Population Gender Disparity (0-4 yrs.) United Nations Population 
Division 
191 1950-2010  
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Indicator 
Source 
Availability 
(countries)* Availability (time-series)** Limitations 
Mobile Phone Subscriptions (per 100) World Development 
Indicators (2011)2 
202 2000-2010 2000 is taken as the baseline year for mobile phone subscriptions, so 
predictions to 2030 must be based on 10 year periods of change, rather 
than 20. 
Forest Area as % of Total World Development 
Indicators (2011)2 
203 1990-2010 The percentage given in recent years can be deceiving, since it is 
commonplace for these numbers to increase in countries that have 
"discovered" forest land or reclassified land previously defined as non-
forest. 
Alternative Energy Use as % of Total World Development 
Indicators (2011)2 
134 1970-2010  
Military Spending % GDP World Development 
Indicators (2011)2 
134 1990-2030   
*The availability of countries refers to the number of countries for which a 2030 projection is possible, given data availability from 2007/2008/2009/2010 and back in 20 year periods. Global and 
developing weighted averages may be composed of a smaller number of countries 
**Refers to data which is utilized in the regression analyses, not necessarily the data which is available from the source. Values for 2010 are estimates 
1. Data is updated from “Growth and human capital: Good data, good results,” Journal of Economic Growth (2007) 
2. Data from the World Development Indicators is taken from the 15 December, 2010 release, downloaded January 2011 
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To perform time-series regressions using these indicators, in most cases 
estimates for 2010 were generated from preceding years to permit the use of 
regression coefficients to make forward predictions to 2030. Depending on the 
historical transition of the indicator itself, values for 2010 are extrapolated using a 
compounded growth rate, primarily manipulating data points from 2000 and 2009 
(or 2007/2008, depending on the availability of data). 
4C. DESCRIPTION OF METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of making forecasts on this cross-country data is to aggregate 
country-level predictions to a global-level business as usual estimate of 
performance in 2030. An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model is 
utilized, wherein a time series is constructed with lagged independent variables 
to predict (current and) future levels of the selected indicators. 
Mathematically, each country indicator observation is regressed against the 
observation from twenty years in the past and the squared term of this past 
observation (to identify marginal effects). The estimation model takes the form of 
equation (1) below: 
(1) Yt = β0 + β1(Yt-1) + β2((Yt-1)2) + µ  
where Yt is the value of the indicator at any time t (excluding the base year) and 
Yt-1 is the 20-year lag observation. The squared term is entered to capture 
curvature in the historical path. β1 and β2 are the regression coefficients, µ is the 
error term, and β0 the constant, which can be conceptually understood as the 
global trend in the indicator. What the model provides is coefficients on 20-year 
periods of change, which can then be utilized to make out-of-sample predictions 
for 2030 (from extrapolated 2010 data). Where an indicator is taken in the log 
form, the term associated with the β2 coefficient is dropped.  
One benefit of this simple lag regression model (versus traditional linear models) 
is that a full set of time-series data points is not needed. The average 20-year 
change (captured by the β1) is applied to all countries for which an “endline” data 
point is available. This allows us to calculate an average state of progress on 
each indicator with a larger number of countries, even if these are not included in 
the regression equation which provides the forecast coefficients. 
4D. RESULTS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
In figures 1-10 (in Annex III), actual values for 2010 are plotted against their 
predicted values from the lag regression described above. Each point represents 
the coordinates for an actual versus predicted value of the indicator under 
consideration. A point on the line represent a perfect prediction. Given the 
number of observations on or near the line, it is clear that simple models work for 
many development indicators.17 Having said that, it is worth noting that, 
particularly with regard to countries which had some of the highest rates of 
mortality in 1990, progress on child and maternal mortality has been more rapid 
                                                 
17 Predicted rates for secondary education completion are cut-off at 1.0 since countries with high initial 
completion rates could have predictions greater than 100% completion. 
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than would be expected on the basis of the model.18 This provides some 
optimism that progress going forward could continue at a rate more rapid than a 
‘business as usual’ forecast based on past trends. 
The results for applying this time series model to the child mortality rate from 
1960-2009, the secondary completion rate from 1970-2010, and forest area as a 
percentage of total land area from 1990-2010 are promising. The models explain 
more than 90% of the variation in the indicators at time t, and the lagged 
independent variables and constant are both statistically significant (Annex I 
contains the regression output). High levels of variation can also be explained for 
the maternal mortality rate, life expectancy at birth, and to a lesser extent, 
alternative energy use as a percentage of total energy use. 
                                                 
18 For example, there are almost o datapoints to the right of the line in the case of initial CMR in 1990 
being above 80. 
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Table 7. Potential MDG Targets for 2030: Population Weighted Global Averages 
(OLS Estimates) 
Indicator Population weighted averages 
Proposed goal in the 
declaration language 2010 2030 low 2030 mid 2030 high 
Secondary Completion (% of pop. 
25 and older) (n=95) 30.00 38.60 42.24 45.87 50% increase 
Child Mortality Rate (per 1,000) 
(n=190) 42.63 20.73 23.99 27.78 50% decrease 
Maternal Mortality Rate (per 
100,000 live births) (n=180) 163.76 89.07 111.98 140.83 50% decrease 
Undernourishment (%) (n=174) 13.66 9.47 11.67 13.87 
Less than one in ten 
undernourished 
Life Expectancy at Birth (n=191) 69.36 60.67 72.86 87.50 
75 years (approx. 8% 
increase in average life 
expectancy) 
Population Gender Disparity (0-4 
yrs.)1 (n=191) 0.925 0.933 0.936 0.939 
Halt and reverse pop. gender 
disparities 
Mobile Phone Subscriptions (per 
100) (n=200) 101.07 158.61 208.64 274.45 
Ensure universal access to 
communications 
technologies 
Forest Area as % of Total 
(n=201) 26.65 21.68 24.85 28.02 
Halt and reverse global trend 
towards deforestation 
Alternative Energy Use as % of 
Total (n=134) 5.99 7.18 8.66 10.15 
Double the renewable share 
of global energy production 
Military Spending % GDP 
(n=134) 2.31 1.31 1.72 2.14 33% decrease 
Source: Authors' calculations using World Bank, Hogan et al. (2010), Soto & Cohen (2010) and UN Data (2011) 
*Projections are based on middle ground predictions using an entire sample of countries and 95% C.I.s. Low and high 
predictions are calculated as one s.e. from the middle ground prediction 
1. Population gender disparity is reported as the total number of girls ages 0-4 divided by the total number of boys ages 0-4 
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Table 8. Potential MDG Targets for 2030: Population Weighted Rates of Change 2010-
2030 (OLS Estimates) 
Indicator 
Global Population Weighted Averages 
Expected Progress 
under pessimistic 
scenario 
Expected 
Progress under 
middle ground 
scenario 
Expected 
Progress under 
optimistic scenario 
Proposed goal in the 
declaration language 
Secondary Completion (% of pop. 
25 and older) 28.7% 40.8% 52.9% 50% increase 
Child Mortality Rate (per 1,000) -34.8% -43.7% -51.4% 50% decrease 
Maternal Mortality Rate (per 
100,000 live births) -14.0% -31.6% -45.6% 50% decrease 
Undernourishment (%) 1.5% -14.6% -30.7% 
Less than one in ten 
undernourished 
Life Expectancy at Birth -12.5% 5.0% 26.2% 
75 years (approx. 8% 
increase in average life 
expectancy) 
Population Gender Disparity (0-4 
yrs.)1 0.8% 1.1% 1.5% 
Halt and reverse pop. 
gender disparities 
Mobile Phone Subscriptions (per 
100) 56.9% 106.4% 171.5% 
Ensure universal 
access to 
communications 
technologies 
Forest Area as % of Total -18.7% -6.8% 5.1% 
Halt and reverse global 
trend towards 
deforestation 
Alternative Energy Use as % of 
Total 19.7% 44.6% 69.4% 
Double the renewable 
share of global energy 
production 
Military Spending % GDP -7.6% -25.5% -43.5% 33% decrease 
Source: Authors' calculations using World Bank, Hogan et al. (2010), Soto & Cohen (2010) and UN Data (2011) 
*Projections are based on middle ground predictions using an entire sample of countries and 95% C.I.s. Optimistic/pessimistic 
predictions are calculated as one s.e. from the middle ground prediction 
1. Population gender disparity is reported as the total number of girls ages 0-4 divided by the total number of boys ages 0-4 
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Tables 7-8 above provide the global population weighted19 averages for 2030, 
and the corresponding percentage change in the indicators from 2010-2030, 
based on the forward predictions from the OLS regressions. Figures 11-20 in 
Annex III show the transition paths that these indicators would follow at the global 
level, accounting for upper and lower bounds of progress for 2010-2030. The 
upper and lower-bound estimates are not the global five percent confidence 
intervals. They are the population-weighted average of the lower and upper 
bound confidence intervals at the country level. As such, these 
pessimistic/optimistic outcomes are better viewed as the extreme bound of likely 
outcomes in 2030.20  
The results in table 7 suggest that by 2030, assuming a business as usual 
scenario, approximately 27% of the world population aged 25 and older will have 
obtained secondary completion, the child mortality rate will have dropped to 
approximately 24 per 1,000, the maternal mortality rate will have decreased to 
approximately 112 deaths per 100,000 live births, and life expectancy at birth will 
have increased to nearly 73 years. 
The predictions for mobile phone coverage likely provides an artificially large 
number since such a great deal of expansion occurred in the 2000s, and the 
expectation is that the rate of growth will diminish over time. Nonetheless, we can 
safely predict that the world will see more than 100 more subscriptions per 100 
people at the global level, and most of this is due to growth in the developing 
world. In turn, this suggests a goal of universal access to basic information and 
communications technologies is plausible. 
The simple model regarding forest area suggests that there is still deforestation 
(understood here as the proportion of total land area classified as forest), but the 
rate over the 20 year period is low enough such that one could imagine the 
possibility of a global halt of deforestation at the aggregate level, and perhaps an 
increase in the proportion over time (as suggested by the optimistic estimate).  
Other indicators are less promising (as well as more problematic to predict). For 
example, the model suggests undernourishment will have only dropped 15% 
from the global average of approximately 14% to 12%. Population gender 
disparity will remain almost unchanged in global weighted average terms. Lastly, 
military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are expected to decrease from 
2.3% to 1.7% from 2010 to 2030 under a business as usual scenario.
                                                 
19 Population data for weighted averages comes from the UN (2011) 
20 Our proposed goal language purposely falls somewhere in between the middle ground and optimistic 
scenarios, since the MDGs are designed to be stretch goals. 
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Table 9. Potential MDG Targets for 2030: Population Weighted Global Averages 
(non-OLS estimates) 
Indicator Aggregation method 
Population Weighted Averages 
2010* 2030 (linear) 
2030 
(compounded) 
Secondary Completion (% of pop. 25 
and older) (n=95) 
Sample average 
30.00 39.77 44.49 
Aggregated Average  
30.00 39.25 50.14 
Child Mortality Rate (per 1,000) 
(n=189) 
Sample average 59.28 26.71 38.26 
Aggregated Average  
42.63 8.62 28.77 
Maternal Mortality Rate (per 100,000 
live births) (n=179) 
Sample average 163.76 86.21 111.13 
Aggregated Average  
163.76 71.93 143.40 
Undernourishment (%) (n=174) 
Sample average 12.93 5.30 8.13 
Aggregated Average  
13.66 4.25 15.86 
Life Expectancy at Birth (n=189) 
Sample average 69.40 73.84 74.14 
Aggregated Average  
69.35 73.94 74.66 
Population Gender Disparity (0-4 
yrs.)1 (n=193) 
Sample average 0.925 0.906 0.906 
Aggregated Average  
0.925 0.909 0.911 
Mobile Phone Subscriptions (per 100) 
(n=194) 
Sample average 88.60 176.99  36,629.42  
Aggregated Average  
100.93 199.59  4,099,924.00  
Forest Area as % of Total (n=173) 
Sample average 30.15 28.90 28.95 
Aggregated Average  
26.57 25.37 26.85 
Alternative Energy Use as % of Total2 
(n=133) 
Sample average 8.67 8.58 8.58 
Aggregated Average  
6.11 7.16 12.29 
Military Spending % GDP (n=102) 
Sample average 2.65 1.62 1.91 
Aggregated Average  
2.28 1.00 1.89 
Source: Authors' calculations using World Bank, Hogan et al. (2010), Soto & Cohen (2010) and UN Data (2011) 
*The number of countries for which there is data could be smaller for this second set of projections, since data points for 
1990 and 2010 are needed. Data points can be missing in the projections from the OLS regressions 
1. Population gender disparity is reported as the total number of girls ages 0-4 divided by the total number of boys ages 
0-4 
2. Iceland and Paraguay dropped because of artificially high percentages 
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Table 10. Potential MDG Targets for 2030: Population Weighted Rates of Change 2010-2030 (non-
OLS estimates) 
Indicator 
Global Population Weighted Averages 
Expected 
Progress sample 
average (linear) 
Expected 
Progress sample 
average 
(compounded) 
Expected 
Progress 
aggregated 
average (linear) 
Expected 
Progress 
aggregated 
average 
(compounded) 
Proposed goal in the 
declaration language 
Secondary Completion (% of pop. 
25 and older) 33% 48% 30.8% 67.1% 50% increase 
Child Mortality Rate (per 1,000) -55% -35% -79.8% -32.5% 50% decrease 
Maternal Mortality Rate (per 
100,000 live births) -47% -32% -56.1% -12.4% 50% decrease 
Undernourishment (%) -67% -37% -68.9% 16.1% 
Less than one in ten 
undernourished 
Life Expectancy at Birth 6% 7% 6.6% 7.6% 
75 years (approx. 8% 
increase in average 
life expectancy) 
Population Gender Disparity (0-4 
yrs.)1 -2% -2% -1.7% -1.5% 
Halt and reverse pop. 
gender disparities 
Mobile Phone Subscriptions (per 
100) 100% 41241% 97.8% 4061993.7% 
Ensure universal 
access to 
communications 
technologies 
Forest Area as % of Total -4% -4% -4.5% 1.1% 
Halt and reverse 
global trend towards 
deforestation 
Alternative Energy Use as % of 
Total -1% -1% 17.1% 101.0% 
Double the renewable 
share of global energy 
production 
Military Spending % GDP -39% -28% -56.4% -17.4% 33% decrease 
Source: Authors' calculations using World Bank, Hogan et al. (2010), Soto & Cohen (2010) and UN Data (2011) 
1. Population gender disparity is reported as the total number of girls ages 0-4 divided by the total number of boys ages 0-4 
 
 32 
 
Tables 9-10 above serve as a simple robustness check of the OLS forecasts. We 
use global forecasts of progress based on aggregated country-level linear and 
compound forecasts as well as forecasts based on global average data. In all 
cases, we use data points from 1990 and 2010 (trended from 2008/9 data). The 
first row for each indicator represents a forecast based on population-weighted 
global averages from 1990-2010.21 This is broadly the approach that 
Vandermortele and Delamonica (2010) suggest was followed to derive the 
baseline year for the first set of MDGs. The second row represents the average 
of country-level forecasts, which are aggregated as population-weighted 
averages post-forecast for 2030. That is to say, each country has its own 
forecasted values (linear and compounded) for 2030, and these are aggregated 
using population weights. The aggregated averages are the closest parallel to 
the OLS estimates of Table 7, which are also aggregated from country forecasts 
using population weights. 
The results in Table 9 above are slightly higher for most indicators than the OLS 
estimates in Table 7 when considering the compounded growth only (the two 
notable exceptions being the rate of undernourishment, the population gender 
disparity). Compounding mobile subscriptions is difficult given the magnitude of 
change from 2000-2010 in the number of subscriptions at the country level; the 
projections for 2030 clearly demonstrate the problem of making valid predictions 
of such a rapidly changing indicator. On the other hand, when applying a linear 
growth rate, the projections fall on either side of the OLS projections; there does 
not seem to be a clear tendency above or below. These results generally confirm 
that the OLS projections are reasonable, and can be accepted with a certain 
amount of reliability.  
4E. OTHER NON-INCOME FORECASTS 
There is a growing consensus around the idea of a Millennium Learning Goal, 
which garners legitimacy from a strong focus in the UNESCO-sponsored Jomtien 
Declaration of Education for All on the quality of learning.22 However, there is 
inadequate cross-country data on learning to forecast plausible outcomes in 
2030 (Birdsall & Kenny, 2012 forthcoming). Given that, we utilize a potential 
aspirational target of universal basic literacy and numeracy amongst primary 
school graduates, combined with language aimed at more advanced countries 
regarding a broader range of skills.  
The scientific community has agreed that, to assure global temperature change 
does not exceed 2oC, a reverse in the GHG emissions trend would need to occur 
by 2020. Clearly this is a considerable departure from business as usual and 
invalidates a targeting approach based on historical trends. The reversal in 
emissions is nonetheless one of the goals we propose, based on the fact that the 
                                                 
21 The values in this first set of rows named sample averages for 2010 can in fact represent two different 
averages. For WDI datasets, these values are “world” values published in the WDI (without formulas) and 
meant to represent a global population weighted value for a sample of countries that the World Bank 
chooses. Where the dataset is not from the WDI, this value represents a population weighted value based 
on a sample of all of the countries for which data is published. Since the three datasets that are not from 
the WDI have no country missing values, these two methods –ours and the World Bank’s -should in 
theory be the same.  
22 Filmer, et al. (2006) 
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Cancun Climate Change Conference agreed that climate change should be 
limited to 2oC or less.23 It is worth noting that, by the time of the 2015 MDG 
summit, parties to the Kyoto Protocol agreed in Durban that they would have 
agreed a globally binding treaty to come into force in 2020. If this agreement 
does emerge, it may provide stronger language for an environment development 
goal –as might the 2012 Rio+10 Summit.  
Similarly, based on historical patterns of change, alternative energy use as a 
percentage of total energy use is expected to increase nearly 3% at the global 
level between 2010 and 2030. This result is completely inadequate if significant 
climate change is to be avoided. Given this, we use forecast estimates based on 
data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the International 
Energy Agency (IEA), regarding the share of renewable sources in electricity 
production and the share of renewable sources in total energy production under 
a range of scenarios.24 For example, the EIA’s International Energy Outlook 
(2010) suggests that by 2035, 13.5% of all energy should be renewable under its 
‘reference case’. Similarly, energy for electricity generation should grow from 
18% renewable in 2007 to 23% renewable in 2035 under that case.  
The IEA provides (in addition to a current policies scenario) estimates for two 
stretch scenarios –the New Policies Scenario and the 450 Scenario, the latter of 
which represents the most dramatic reduction in GHG emissions, required to 
assure a limit in the increase in the global average temperature to 2oC. The IEA’s 
World Energy Outlook (2010) suggests that the share of renewable and nuclear 
sources in total energy production under that scenario should represent between 
22% and 38% of the total in 2035, more than double our model predictions. In 
terms of energy for electricity generation, the report estimates that anywhere 
from 45% to more than half of total electricity generation should come from 
renewable or nuclear sources.25  
With regard to biodiversity, the Nagoya Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity agreed that the extinction of known threatened 
species should be prevented, that areas under agriculture, aquaculture and 
forestry as well as all fish and invertebrate stocks and aquatic plants should be 
managed sustainably by 2020, and that incentives, including subsidies, harmful 
to biodiversity should be eliminated, phased out or reformed. In the tradition of 
the original MDGs, we add this language to the strawman environment goal.  
A set of targets for 2030 to address energy access is implausible using our 
forecasting techniques because of limited historical data. It is worth noting that 
Bazilian & Nussbaumer (2011) report on the basis of a small number of countries 
that it is possible to go from 40% household electricity access to ubiquity in as 
little as 20 to 30 years, although many countries now near universal access took 
considerably longer and many countries in the developing world are some 
                                                 
23 UNFCCC (2010) 
24 It is important to note that our indicator, alternative energy use, captures all energy use, whereas the 
IEA and EIA distinguish between an indicator that captures only energy utilized for electricity production and 
total energy separately. 
25 Estimates correspond to EAI and IEA reports for 2010. Estimates may have changed slightly in 2011 
reports. 
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distance from 40% access today. The IEA has estimated that it would cost $36 
billion per year to ensure universal access to electricity (grid or off-grid) and clean 
cooking facilities (LPG, biogas or advanced biomass) by 2030, but on current 
trends, the number of people lacking access to electricity would fall from 1.4 to 
1.2 billion and the number relying on traditional biomass cooking would climb 
from 2.7 to 2.8 billion.26 Given the large financing costs and the fact that 
extending access would require considerably more than financing alone, but 
based on the increasing cost-competitiveness of solar lighting,27 we suggest a 
watered-down access goal of universal access to electric lighting and extended 
access to clean cooking technologies. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Debate will soon turn to a new set of MDGs. Taking the existing MDG model as a 
base, we outline potential goal areas based on a reading of the Millennium 
Declaration and extract a list of goals that might be acceptable to a gathering of 
world leaders in 2015. We attach targets to those goals where plausible, using 
simple forecast models where these work, basing target levels near the upper 
bound of the range of plausible outcomes given past trends in order to reflect the 
concept that the MDGs are designed to motivate better performance. We present 
these results as an input to a discussion on post-2015 MDGs that we believe 
should be broad-based and intensive over the next three years.  
With that caveat, Annex II lays out some potential language for a UN document 
outlining a new set of Goals for development covering 2010-2030 which 
incorporates the goals we believe might be both politically plausible, amenable to 
change and accomplishable. The six paragraphs we would see as ‘goal 
language’ are the following: 
XX. While recognizing countries will see differing rates of progress across 
different areas of development, and that countries will have different priorities 
for their own path to development, we resolve further: 
• To ensure that, by the year 2030, the proportion of the world’s people 
whose income is less than two dollars a day or that is undernourished 
is below one in ten, and to expand access to decent work worldwide.  
• To ensure that, by the same date, all children will complete primary 
school with a mastery of basic literacy and numeracy, to increase 
global secondary completion in the population 25 and above by 50 
percent, and to accelerate progress for all towards improved mastery 
of language, writing, math and science skills required a for productive 
role in national and global societies. 
• By the same date, to have increased global average life expectancy to 
75 years, reduced global maternal mortality to below one per 
thousand births and reduced global under-five child mortality to half its 
level in 2010. 
                                                 
26 IEA, 2010b 
27 Macharia, et al. (2010) 
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• To have, by then, halted, and begun to reverse, trends towards 
greater population disparities in the number of girls and boys at age 
five in every country where such trends have been manifest and to 
have made broad-based progress on ensuring equality of opportunity 
regardless of gender, race, ethnicity or sexual orientation. 
• By the same date, to have reversed the global trend towards 
deforestation, doubled the renewable share of global energy 
production, halted (by 2020) and reversed growth in global 
greenhouse gas emissions, ensured areas worldwide used for 
agriculture, aquaculture and forestry as well as all fish stocks are 
managed sustainably, and prevented the extinction of known 
threatened species. 
• By the same date to have ensured universal access to basic 
information and communications technologies as well as to electric 
lighting; and extended access to transport, improved water and 
sewage facilities, networked electricity, and clean cooking 
technologies. 
 
XX. We resolve in addition to ensure that progress towards these goals 
across and within countries is more rapid amongst those groups currently 
most disadvantaged –to promote a convergence in the national and global 
quality of life. 
 
XX. We highlight the continued and central importance of economic growth 
and private sector development to improvements in the quality of life 
especially in the World’s poorest countries alongside strong networks of 
social protection. With regard to broad-based progress in the quality of life we 
emphasize the following priority areas for action: food security; continued 
progress against infectious disease including malaria and HIV/AIDS; an 
increased commitment to tackle the scourge of non-communicable diseases 
and their causes including smoking and obesity; natural disaster risk 
reduction; and improvement in the quality of government service provision in 
the world’s slums and rural areas;[…]  
 
XX. We reiterate that civil and political rights including democratic and 
participatory governance, security and the rule of law are all ends of 
development in and of themselves as well as vital inputs to broad based 
progress. We celebrate the global trend towards reduced violent crime and 
conflict and reiterate our commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes 
between and within countries. We repeat our call for the elimination of 
weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons and for countries 
to take concerted action to end illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons, 
especially by making arms transfers more transparent and supporting 
regional disarmament measures. We commit ourselves to further efforts to 
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reduce the global burden of violence in accordance with the Geneva 
Declaration on Armed Violence and Development.  
XX. In order to assist in financing the achievement of these goals, we further 
resolve to reduce global military expenditure expressed as a proportion of 
global output by one third of its proportion in 2010 and to ensure that all high-
income countries make progress towards the target of 0.7% of GDP in 
overseas development assistance, and to link assistance levels to rates of 
progress towards these goals in recipient countries. We reiterate the 
principles laid out in the Busan Declaration and elsewhere regarding the 
importance of coordination, transparency and the use of country systems to 
effective development assistance. 
XX. We recognize that high-income countries share responsibilities towards 
global development that extend considerably beyond development 
assistance. These responsibilities include:  
• Duty-free, quota-free access for the exports of the World’s poorest 
countries; 
• Further progress towards sustainable debt burdens amongst the 
World’s poorest countries; 
• Greater use of immigration as a tool of development, including 
ensuring the low cost of remittance flows; 
• Ensuring those in greatest need worldwide are able to access 
technologies and ideas vital to their livelihoods in areas including 
health and agriculture;  
• Taking financial and policy leadership in responding to the urgent 
need to protect the global commons (including climate, biodiversity, 
forests and fisheries); and 
• Responding to the special needs of Africa and fragile states, in 
particular supporting country-led and country-owned transitions out of 
fragility through use of aid that is transparent, predictable and uses 
country systems. 
  
We have written goal language in an effort to ensure global targets are not 
misconstrued as developing region or country targets. We have also included 
language regarding goals that appear of considerable interest to the international 
community but appear to us hard (as of yet) to quantify in a way that will be 
widely accepted: these areas include advanced learning outcomes, employment, 
civil and political rights and rich world commitments. 
At the same time, Annex II also suggests a reporting mechanism that would allow 
global goals to gain traction at the local level. The proposed language suggests 
“We commit that all signatories will provide to the Secretary General, within 
eighteen months of this declaration, plans outlining national commitments 
towards meeting the global goals aspirations and responsibilities laid out in the 
declaration. We ask the Secretary General to issue a report on the basis of these 
plans regarding the extent to which aggregated national commitments are 
sufficient to meet the goals, responsibilities and aspirations.” This is akin to the 
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model adopted at the Cancun Climate Change Conference where the global 2°C 
climate change target was ‘matched’ with voluntary country-level commitments to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
To emphasize: we see this potential list of MDGs as a straw man to assist 
discussion and debate, as well as to illustrate approaches to realistic goal- and 
target-setting. We believe the next three years should see an active and globally 
participatory debate over the need for and nature of any new set of MDGs –a 
discussion we much look forward to.  
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Annex I: OLS Regression Estimates 
Table A1: OLS Regression Output for MDG Targets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES Sec. Complete CMR MMR Undernourishment Life Expectancy 0-4 Disparity Mobile Subscrip. Forest Cover Alt. Energy Use Mil. Expenditure 
           
y_lag 1.88***   0.72***  0.40***  0.97*** 1.24*** 0.37*** 
 (0.063)   (0.080)  (0.036)  (0.065) (0.140) (0.080) 
y_lag_sq -1.13***   -0.00***  -1.96***  -0.00 -0.01** -0.00*** 
 (0.101)   (0.000)  (0.543)  (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
ln_y_lag  1.10*** 0.97***  0.79***  0.19***    
  (0.017) (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.034)    
Constant 0.03*** -1.11*** -0.34** 2.37** 0.97*** -0.02*** 4.36*** 0.73 2.09*** 0.88*** 
 (0.005) (0.072) (0.101) (0.898) (0.091) (0.001) (0.095) (0.554) (0.417) (0.223) 
           
Observations 190 330 181 175 376 582 186 175 240 102 
R-squared 0.94 0.90 0.90 0.46 0.81 0.38 0.22 0.93 0.63 0.47 
Adj. R-squared 0.94 0.90 0.90 0.45 0.81 0.38 0.22 0.93 0.63 0.46 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Mobile subscriptions per 100 uses a 10 year lag rather than 20 year lag 
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Annex II: Draft Language for an Update to the Millennium Declaration 
Continuing the Commitment to the United Nations Millennium Declaration 
I. Values and principles 
1. We, heads of State and Government, have gathered at United Nations 
Headquarters in New York from [X to X] September 2015, to reaffirm the values 
and commitments laid out in the United Nations Millennium Declaration, and to 
set new Goals for development progress to guide international efforts over the 
next fifteen years. 
2. We reaffirm our faith in the United Nations and its Charter as indispensable 
foundations of a more peaceful, prosperous and just world and our collective 
responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality and equity at the 
global level. We remain determined to establish a just and lasting peace all over 
the world in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. And we 
stand firm in our commitment to the fundamental values essential to international 
relations in the twenty-first century: freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, 
respect for nature and shared responsibility. 
[….] 
II. Sustainable development and poverty eradication 
XX. We recognize the considerable global progress that has been achieved 
towards the Goals for development laid out in the Millennium Declaration. In 
particular we celebrate the global success in more than halving rates of absolute 
poverty worldwide, while recognizing that: progress has been less rapid than 
hoped at the global level in other areas; rates of progress varied considerably 
across and within countries; and too many men women and children worldwide 
remain leading lives of unconscionable deprivation. 
XX. While recognizing countries will see differing rates of progress across 
different areas of development, and that countries will have different priorities 
for their own path to development, we resolve further: 
• To ensure that, by the year 2030, the proportion of the world’s people 
whose income is less than two dollars a day or that is undernourished 
is below one in ten, and to expand access to decent work worldwide.  
• To ensure that, by the same date, all children will complete primary 
school with a mastery of basic literacy and numeracy, to increase 
global secondary completion in the population 25 and above by 50 
percent, and to accelerate progress for all towards improved mastery 
of language, writing, math and science skills required a for productive 
role in national and global societies. 
• By the same date, to have increased global average life expectancy to 
75 years, reduced global maternal mortality to below one per 
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thousand births and reduced global under-five child mortality to half its 
level in 2010. 
• To have, by then, halted, and begun to reverse, trends towards 
greater population disparities in the number of girls and boys at age 
five in every country where such trends have been manifest and to 
have made broad-based progress on ensuring equality of opportunity 
regardless of gender, race, ethnicity or sexual orientation. 
• By the same date, to have reversed the global trend towards 
deforestation, doubled the renewable share of global energy 
production, halted (by 2020) and reversed growth in global 
greenhouse gas emissions, ensured areas worldwide used for 
agriculture, aquaculture and forestry as well as all fish stocks are 
managed sustainably, and prevented the extinction of known 
threatened species. 
• By the same date to have ensured universal access to basic 
information and communications technologies as well as to electric 
lighting; and extended access to transport, improved water and 
sewage facilities, networked electricity, and clean cooking 
technologies. 
XX. We resolve in addition to ensure that progress towards these goals 
across and within countries is more rapid amongst those groups currently 
most disadvantaged –to promote a convergence in the national and global 
quality of life. 
XX. We highlight the continued and central importance of economic growth 
and private sector development to improvements in the quality of life 
especially in the World’s poorest countries alongside strong networks of 
social protection. With regard to broad-based progress in the quality of life we 
emphasize the following priority areas for action: food security; continued 
progress against infectious disease including malaria and HIV/AIDS; an 
increased commitment to tackle the scourge of non-communicable diseases 
and their causes including smoking and obesity; natural disaster risk 
reduction; and improvement in the quality of government service provision in 
the world’s slums and rural areas;[…]  
XX. We reiterate that civil and political rights including democratic and 
participatory governance, security and the rule of law are all ends of 
development in and of themselves as well as vital inputs to broad based 
progress. We celebrate the global trend towards reduced violent crime and 
conflict and reiterate our commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes 
between and within countries. We repeat our call for the elimination of 
weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons and for countries 
to take concerted action to end illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons, 
especially by making arms transfers more transparent and supporting 
regional disarmament measures. We commit ourselves to further efforts to 
reduce the global burden of violence in accordance with the Geneva 
Declaration on Armed Violence and Development.  
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XX. In order to assist in financing the achievement of these goals, we further 
resolve to reduce global military expenditure expressed as a proportion of 
global output by one third of its proportion in 2010 and to ensure that all high-
income countries make progress towards the target of 0.7% of GDP in 
overseas development assistance, and to link assistance levels to rates of 
progress towards these goals in recipient countries. We reiterate the 
principles laid out in the Busan Declaration and elsewhere regarding the 
importance of coordination, transparency and the use of country systems to 
effective development assistance. 
XX. We recognize that high-income countries share responsibilities towards 
global development that extend considerably beyond development 
assistance. These responsibilities include:  
• Duty-free, quota-free access for the exports of the World’s poorest 
countries; 
• Further progress towards sustainable debt burdens amongst the 
World’s poorest countries; 
• Greater use of immigration as a tool of development, including 
ensuring the low cost of remittance flows; 
• Ensuring those in greatest need worldwide are able to access 
technologies and ideas vital to their livelihoods in areas including 
health and agriculture;  
• Taking financial and policy leadership in responding to the urgent 
need to protect the global commons (including climate, biodiversity, 
forests and fisheries); and 
• Responding to the special needs of Africa and fragile states, in 
particular supporting country-led and country-owned transitions out of 
fragility through use of aid that is transparent, predictable and uses 
country systems. 
 [….] 
XX. We commit that all signatories will provide to the Secretary General, within 
eighteen months of this declaration, plans outlining national commitments 
towards meeting the global goals aspirations and responsibilities laid out in the 
declaration. We ask the Secretary General to issue a report on the basis of these 
plans regarding the extent to which aggregated national commitments are 
sufficient to meet the goals, responsibilities and aspirations. We request the 
General Assembly to review on a regular basis the progress made in 
implementing the provisions of this Declaration, and ask the Secretary-General to 
issue periodic reports for consideration by the General Assembly and as a basis 
for further action. 
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Annex III: Figures 
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Annex IV: MDGs Targets for 2030 by Region and Income Group28 
Table A2. Potential MDG Targets for 2030: Population Weighted Global Averages by Region (OLS Estimates) 
Indicator Sub-Saharan Africa South Asia East Asia 
Middle East & North 
Africa 
Latin America & 
Caribbean Europe & Central Asia 
2010 2030 mid 2010 2030 mid 2010 2030 mid 2010 2030 mid 2010 2030 mid 2010 2030 mid 
Secondary Completion 
(% of pop. 25 and 
older) 8.02 16.60 13.32 26.35 28.82 47.91 29.82 48.63 28.21 46.39 39.30 56.00 
Child Mortality Rate 
(per 1,000) 122.21 66.31 65.58 33.66 23.06 10.77 29.82 14.32 20.14 9.25 17.48 8.26 
Maternal Mortality Rate 
(per 100,000 live 
births) 517.61 307.90 279.08 174.18 69.68 45.06 67.93 45.26 63.13 40.51 35.50 23.55 
Undernourishment (%) 25.74 17.55 22.05 16.63 10.29 9.40 7.14 7.48 8.57 8.28 6.28 6.85 
Life Expectancy at 
Birth 52.68 59.44 64.82 69.80 72.68 76.43 71.03 74.92 73.80 77.35 69.93 74.23 
Population Gender 
Disparity (0-4 yrs.)1 0.98 0.97 0.93 0.94 0.87 0.89 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 
Mobile Phone 
Subscriptions (per 100) 75.54 205.44 87.24 208.37 85.10 207.47 124.59 210.18 124.43 210.87 172.29 213.43 
Forest Area as % of 
Total 23.05 22.56 18.60 17.86 28.89 28.06 3.47 3.86 42.08 39.37 28.07 25.13 
Alternative Energy Use 
as % of Total 2.91 5.60 2.80 5.54 4.57 7.67 1.08 3.38 10.68 14.19 9.14 12.08 
Military Spending % 
GDP 1.57 1.46 2.73 1.87 1.79 1.53 3.26 2.09 1.51 1.43 3.18 2.01 
Source: Authors' calculations using World Bank, Hogan et al. (2010), Soto & Cohen (2010) and UN Data (2011) 
*Projections are based on middle ground predictions using an entire sample of countries and 95% C.I.s 
1. Population gender disparity is reported as the total number of girls ages 0-4 divided by the total number of boys ages 0-4 
                                                 
28 Country level estimates for 2030 are available online for public viewing at [insert web address] 
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Table A3. Potential MDG Targets for 2030: Population Weighted Global Averages by Current Income Group 
(OLS Estimates) 
Indicator LICs LMICs UMICs 
All Developing 
countries HICs 
2010 2030 mid 2010 2030 mid 2010 2030 mid 2010 2030 mid 2010 2030 mid 
Secondary Completion 
(% of pop. 25 and 
older) 8.36 16.98 22.18 37.82 29.63 47.97 21.59 36.14 72.51 77.29 
Child Mortality Rate 
(per 1,000) 102.13 57.03 45.62 24.03 19.95 9.14 49.54 27.55 5.88 2.47 
Maternal Mortality 
Rate (per 100,000 live 
births) 455.27 281.85 169.61 110.41 56.86 36.19 192.42 129.20 11.32 7.79 
Undernourishment (%) 31.37 20.71 14.32 12.03 5.90 6.51 15.30 12.64 5.00 5.87 
Life Expectancy at 
Birth 57.79 63.13 68.27 72.36 71.68 75.74 67.31 71.25 80.14 82.49 
Population Gender 
Disparity (0-4 yrs.)1 0.97 0.97 0.90 0.92 0.96 0.96 0.92 0.93 0.95 0.95 
Mobile Phone 
Subscriptions (per 
100) 70.50 203.81 91.14 208.52 139.39 211.63 96.82 208.24 123.13 210.98 
Forest Area as % of 
Total 22.88 21.95 22.88 21.87 34.50 32.06 24.90 23.50 35.91 32.94 
Alternative Energy 
Use as % of Total 3.79 6.48 3.87 6.61 7.97 11.19 4.61 7.37 13.00 16.01 
Military Spending % 
GDP 1.58 1.47 2.31 1.73 2.18 1.66 2.19 1.68 2.91 1.98 
Source: Authors' calculations using World Bank, Hogan et al. (2010), Soto & Cohen (2010) and UN Data (2011) 
*Projections are based on middle ground predictions using an entire sample of countries and 95% C.I.s 
1. Population gender disparity is reported as the total number of girls ages 0-4 divided by the total number of boys ages 0-4 
 
 
